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Abstract 
Aid is an important resource for developing countries. Many small island states 
(including those in the Pacific) are highly reliant on aid to supplement meagre 
government resources and other foreign capital inflows. This paper investigates the 
conditional volatility of aid (for bilateral aid disaggregated into sector aid and 
programme aid, and multilateral aid) to small island states using an econometric 
framework. In addition, year-on-year changes in aid allocation are also considered for 
both changes in aid allocations from major donors to the Pacific as well as for changes 
in aid receipts in 16 Pacific island countries. The entire sample of countries under 
consideration includes 44 aid-receiving (small island) states from the regions of    
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Asia-Pacific, Africa and the Americas over the period 1973 to 2004. This paper finds 
that past aid flows are correlated with present aid flows and that volatility on both sector 
and programme aid in the Americas and Asia-Pacific region are characterized by a 
higher degree of volatility than in the African region. An important result of the analysis 
is that shocks to bilateral aid result in the persistence of volatility for a number of years 
before stabilizing. This evidence of persistence in volatility, whereby the past levels of 
volatility influence the degree of volatility that can be expected in the future, implies a 
certain degree of predictability in the conditional volatility of bilateral aid. The paper 
also finds that on average multilateral aid is not only considerably more volatile than the 
bilateral aid, but it is also more unpredictable.  
  
1 
1 Introduction 
Aid is an important resource for developing countries. Many small island states, 
including those in the Pacific, are highly reliant on aid to supplement meagre 
government resources and other foreign capital inflows. Aid donors to these states are 
limited and dominated by a handful of countries. Consistent and reliable aid allocations 
from these donors are therefore desirable as it is becoming increasingly evident that 
high volatility in aid has a deleterious effect on economic growth and poverty 
alleviation (see Gemmell and McGillivray 1998; Lensink and Morrissey 2001; Bulir 
and Hamann 2001, 2003; Levin and Dollar 2005; Fielding and Mavrotas 2005). 
The analysis of aid volatility has evolved from the aid effectiveness literature. This 
research is concerned with identifying factors which affect the stability of aid flows and 
the impact that this has on economic growth and poverty alleviation. It is important to 
note that various terms are used within the literature (such as variability, volatility and 
(un)predictability) to describe the phenomena of year-on-year changes in aid allocations 
(see for example, Hudson and Mosley 2006; Eifert and Gelb 2006; Arellano et al. 2006; 
Bulir and Hamann 2001). Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, 
the concepts of aid variability and volatility are usually used with negative connotations 
where any variability/volatility is perceived as detrimental. Conversely, the notion of 
‘aid (un)predictability’ is associated with the idea that not all changes in aid inflows are 
unfavourable, so as long as they are anticipated/predictable. In this paper, we seek to 
reconcile the terminology used in the literature. We use the term (conditional)1 volatility 
to describe the degree to which aid allocations vary on a year-by-year basis. We adopt 
the viewpoint that while high volatility is undesirable, low volatility represents periods 
of relatively stable (and thus predictable) aid inflows. Therefore, it is the degree to 
which aid allocations vary that is potentially of concern, not the existence of aid 
volatility per se. 
This paper investigates year-on-year changes in aid allocation to small island states for 
the period 1973 to 2004. Small island states have been excluded from previous aid 
volatility studies. It is presumed this exclusion has been driven by significant data 
constraints. For example, within this paper, whilst 46 small islands states were 
identified as receiving aid during this period, simple estimates of population and gross 
domestic product (GDP) for Niue and Tokelau were not available. Given the size and 
capacity of these countries, it is not surprising that more sophisticated data (concerning 
trade openness, political freedom, imports, exports, etc.) also do not exist. Thus, 
excluding Niue and Tokelau, the sample of countries under consideration includes 44 
aid-receiving small island states from the regions of Asia-Pacific, Africa and the 
Americas. Two exercises are undertaken to consider aid variation. The first employs a 
set of econometric techniques to both derive and model the conditional aid volatility. In 
light of the work of Fielding and Mavrotas (2005), which indicates the importance of 
disaggregating aid flows, we also examine the volatility of two different types of 
bilateral aid, namely the sector and programme aid, in addition to multilateral aid. The 
purpose of this exercise is primarily to examine whether there are extended periods of 
high (low) volatility in aid inflows to small island countries. The second is an analytical 
narrative of year-on-year variation of aid allocations to Pacific island countries by five 
major donors (Australia, France, Japan, UK and US) and of aid receipts to 16 Pacific 
                                                 
1   Conditional on an information set.  
2 
island countries. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate the aid volatility 
experienced within the Pacific as data for these countries are extremely constrained. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The relevant literature is summarized 
in section 2. Section 3 contains the first approach, including a brief description of our 
dataset, the econometric methodology and our empirical findings. Section 4 contains the 
discussion of year-on-year variations before various policy implications are noted in 
section 5. The paper is concluded in section 6. 
2 Relevant  literature 
Investigating year-on-year changes in aid allocation is an important aspect of improving 
aid effectiveness, as ‘aid uncertainty is consistently and significantly negatively related 
to growth, and this result is robust’ (Lensink and Morrissey 2001: 16). Yet despite this 
importance, the literature on aid allocation remains relatively contained to a small 
number of papers and empirical studies.  
Using a sample of 45 developing countries, Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) first 
identified that unpredicted shortfalls in aid frequently resulted in reductions in 
government spending, often resulted in increases in taxes, and were occasionally 
followed by both. These fiscal adjustments were costly, swift (and possibly inefficient), 
but were necessitated by the unexpected and unplanned reduction in aid disbursement 
by donors. 
Using a dataset of 75 developing countries (including a subset of 36 African countries) 
for the period of 1975-95, Lensink and Morrissey (2001) examine the instability and 
uncertainty of aid and the impact that these have on economic growth. They argue that it 
is the stable, and predictable, aid flows that promote economic growth and not the level 
of aid per se, and observe the externalities associated with uncertainty to be higher than 
those associated with overall instability of aid. Their results imply that highly volatile 
aid, rather than achieving the intended effect of encouraging economic growth, actually 
impedes it by making it harder ‘for recipients to predict future aid inflows that may 
permit more investment and better fiscal planning (2001: 16).  
Bulir and Hamann (2003) have undertaken an analysis of variance of aid flows for 72 
countries from 1975 to 1997. They find that aid is generally substantially more volatile 
than fiscal revenue and that those countries more dependent on aid also experience 
higher aid volatility. They further note that aid and domestic revenue move in the same 
direction. Bulir and Hamann conclude that both donors and recipients can reduce 
volatility by increasing compliance with programme objectives, improving programme 
design and enhancing cooperation and coordination amongst donors (see Hudson and 
Mosley 2006 for an alternative view).  
More recently, using the coefficient of variation Vargas Hill (2005) reviews the aid 
volatility for 112 recipient countries between 1975 and 2002. Her general finding that 
‘aid cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of commitments’ (2005: 8) supports the 
need highlighted previously by Bulir and Hamann (2003) that donors must take 
responsibility for volatility alongside recipients.   
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Difficult partnership countries are the focus of Levin and Dollar (2001). These specific 
countries (defined as those countries in the bottom two quintiles of the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment ranking) are heavily reliant on aid to 
balance budgets and/or provide basic services. Reflecting the earlier findings of 
Gemmell and McGillivray (1998), Levin and Dollar (2005: 2) find that for the period 
1992-2002, ‘aid flows to difficult partnership countries are more volatile than those to 
other aid recipients’. Levin and Dollar define aid volatility by measuring the coefficient 
of variation. Levin and Dollar also produce a predictor of aid flows and find that certain 
countries (‘aid darlings’) receive more aid than is expected and other countries (‘aid 
orphans’) receive far less—around 40 per cent less than would be predicted by their 
policy and institutional strengths. The reasons for such volatility are borne by the 
recipient country: ‘Donors react to improvements or deteriorations in recipient 
countries’ policy climate and… to countries coming out of conflict by increasing or 
decreasing aid’ (Levin and Dollar 2005: 23).  
Finally, Fielding and Mavrotas (2005: 2) define volatility as ‘the variance of that part of 
movement in aid that are orthogonal to the information set’. However, unlike previous 
studies, Fielding and Mavrotas distinguish between different types of aid, namely sector 
and programme aid in order to determine specifically volatility in different aid types. 
For 66 recipient countries over the period 1973-2002, they find that the macro stability 
in recipient countries (i.e., low inflation) reduces both sector and programme aid 
volatility and with sector aid in particular, lower volatility is associated with robust 
political institutions. Overall, Latin American recipient countries experience less sector 
aid volatility then recipients from other regions. However, countries that receive aid 
from one or two single donors have greater volatility than those whom receive aid from 
a wide variety of donors.  
As noted, small islands states (particularly those from the Pacific) have been excluded 
from these empirical studies, presumably due to the data constraints faced for these 
countries. 
3 Econometric  analysis 
3.1 Data 
Our dataset consists of information on 442 small island countries from three regions, 
Asia-Pacific (18),3 Americas (20) and Africa (6), for the period from 1973-2004. Data 
were collected from a variety of sources. Data for both bilateral and multilateral aid 
commitments were taken from the Creditor Reporting System database of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee. Multilateral aid was not disaggregated, however 
bilateral aid data were divided into sector aid and programme aid (emergency aid was 
excluded as this is volatile by its very definition). Sector and programme aid account for 
                                                 
2   As noted, we did not have data on GDP or population for two Asia-Pacific countries (Niue and 
Tokelau) even though they did receive aid during this period. They therefore had to be dropped from 
the subsequent analysis of bilateral aid. In case of the multilateral aid, we also had no data for Palau 
and Singapore. 
3  Sixteen of the 18 countries were located in the Pacific, with Singapore and the Maldives being the 
only Asian small island countries. (East Timor is considered a Pacific island country.)  
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over 90 per cent of total bilateral aid flows to these small island states. Sector aid is that 
aid allocated specifically to sectoral activities, such as water, education, health, civil 
society, governance, transport, agriculture, tourism, etc. Sector aid is the largest 
component of total bilateral aid flows and accounts for over two-thirds of total bilateral 
aid flows. Programme aid is allocated for general development purposes without 
specific sector allocation. Programme aid may or may not have restrictions on its 
specific use and includes development activities such as general budget support, food 
aid, and food security assistance. For these small island states, programme aid 
accounted for just less than one-quarter of total bilateral aid flows for the entire period 
1973 to 2004. Multilateral aid was around one-third of the value of sector and 
programme aid for all small island states, and about 20 per cent of sector and 
programme aid for Pacific island states. The other data (population and gross domestic 
product (GDP) were taken from the UN statistical database. All aid data and GDP are 
reported in 2003 US dollars. 
We construct our aid variables using GDP.4 Therefore, the aid of type j received by 
country i in period t, as a proportion of that country’s GDP at time t, is: 
{} 2004 ,... 1973 ; ... 1 ; , ,
/
= = =
=
t N i AL MULTILATER PROGRAM SECTOR j
GDP AID z it
j
it
j
it  
The descriptive statistics associated with the aid variables are shown in Tables A1-A3 in 
Appendix A. We find that our aid variables lack the symmetry required for a variance-
based measure to be meaningful (see Fielding and Mavrotas 2005: 5). For most of the 
countries, and for both types of aid, the skewness is well above the desired value of 
zero. Thus, consistent with Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) we apply the following: 
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+ ⎟
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⎞
⎜
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j
it
t
j
it
j
it z T z y / ln  
The descriptive statistics associated with the transformed variables are given in 
Tables A4-A6 in Appendix A. As indicated by the skewness statistics, the variables 
overall appear to be approximately symmetric with the skewness for the majority of 
countries being in the acceptable range.5 
 
                                                 
4   Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) suggest that remittances to certain countries (they proffer Swaziland as 
an example) are substantial relative to domestic production, thus making GNI a better representative 
of a country’s available resources. However, this practice is not replicated within the wider literature 
(see Bulir and Hamann 2001, 2003; Vargas-Hill 2005; Levin and Dollar 2005; Alesina and Dollar 
2000). Within this study, GDP is used as data because GNI for all countries across the period of study 
are not available. Indeed, a comparison between GDP and GNI (when it does exist) indicates the two 
figures are relatively similar. For example, the average correlation coefficient across all countries is 
0.98 (whilst the range was 0.88 to 1.00), the average standard deviation is 4.2 and the average 
coefficient of variation is 0.042. Thus, when there is significant difference between GDP and GNI due 
to remittances (for example with Kiribati) the ratio between GDP and GNI remains relatively 
constant.  
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3.2 Methodology 
We use an econometric model to extract a measure of aid volatility from our aid 
series
j
it y . We opt for a panel specification which allows us to fully exploit the structure 
of our dataset whereby we have observations over time for a number of different 
countries. The methodology that we use is based upon and broadly consistent with the 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) framework used in financial 
econometrics for the modelling of return volatility (see Engle 1982). In our case, the 
ARCH framework cannot be implemented directly on a country-by-country basis given 
the small number of observations available for each small island state in our dataset. 
Thus, we utilize a two-step modelling process. 
We begin by specifying a theoretical model for the conditional variance of aid. If we 
were to directly follow the ARCH framework in a panel setting, we would extend the 
typical dynamic panel specification to allow for time-varying variance and model the 
following:  
j
it
j
it i it
j
p it p
j
it
j
it
j
it e W y y y y σ α β δ δ δ β + + + + + + + = − − − − 1 2 2 1 1 0 ..    (1) 
i it
j
k it k
j
it
j
it X η θ ε γ ε γ γ σ + + + + + = − −
2 2
1 1 0
2 ) ( ... ) ( ) (    (2) 
where 
j
it
j
it
j
it e σ ε =  is the shock to aid of type j in country i at time t and (1) and (2) 
represent the specifications for the mean and the conditional variance of the aid series, 
respectively.  
The specification given by (1) allows us to remove the autocorrelation from the aid 
series 
j
it y  through p lags of aid, 
j
p it
j
it y y − − ... 1 ; the influences of some country specific 
characteristics such as GDP and population, via  1 − it W , as well as the impacts of the 
unobserved country-specific heterogeneity,  i α . By conditioning on the information set 
(
j
p it
j
it y y − − ... 1 ; 1 − it W ), we isolate the ‘pure’ shocks to aid which then allows us to model the 
conditional aid volatility through the second specification. This specification, given by 
(2), postulates that the conditional variance of aid depends on the past values of the 
squared shocks, impacts of country characteristics contained in  it X  and the effects of 
country specific heterogeneity,  i η . It should be noted that this implies that while the 
shocks to aid are random and should not be serially correlated, autocorrelation is not 
precluded in the squared shock series.  
A problem that we have is that the model given by (1) and (2) cannot be estimated 
directly in its current form. To make the model operational, we will have to use a proxy 
for the unobservable conditional variance of aid and estimate the two equations 
separately. Following the ARCH framework and assuming that
j
it
j
it
j
it v = −
2 2 ) ( ) ( ε σ , then 
(2) can be re-written as: 
j
it i it
j
k it k
j
it
j
it v X + + + + + + = − − η θ ε γ ε γ γ ε
2 2
1 1 0
2 ) ( ... ) ( ) (    (3) 
                                                                                                                                               
5   As indicated by the skewness test and the associated p-value.  
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Thus, (2) translates into a model for the squared shocks 
2 ) (
j
it ε  which are unbiased 
estimates of the conditional variance of aid, 
2 ) (
j
it σ  and can be obtained from (1). 
Therefore, the residuals 
j
it ε ˆ , obtained by estimating (1), will proxy for the ‘pure’ shocks 
to aid,
j
it ε , whereas the squared residuals,
2 ) ˆ (
j
it ε , will represent a measure of aid 
volatility of country i in time period t. These will then be used to estimate (3).  
Our specification for the conditional volatility not only indicates that volatility is time-
varying but also explicitly assumes that it is autocorrelated. In other words, we postulate 
that the level of aid volatility in any given period depends on the level of volatility in 
the past periods. In the financial econometrics literature this impact of the past values is 
viewed and interpreted as an indicator of persistence in volatility. The estimated 
coefficient(s), attached to the lag(s) of the squared shocks, provide information on how 
long it takes for the impact of a shock to aid to disappear. This gives an indication as to 
whether there are extended periods of high (low) volatility and provides further 
information regarding approximately how long these are expected to last. 
3.3  Extracting conditional aid volatility 
In order for our model to be valid, the variables are precluded from being unit root 
processes. Thus, prior to estimation it was necessary to conduct the group unit root test 
(see Im, Pesaran and Shin 2003) on our aid variables, the logarithm of GDP and 
population. In case of both the sector and programme aid variables, the test (including 
an intercept and no trend) leads to a strong rejection of the null hypothesis that the 
variables are unit root processes. The test statistics for sector, programme and 
multilateral aid variables were -5.18, -5.29 and -18.99, respectively. We also rejected 
the null hypothesis of a unit root for the logarithm of population. Unsurprisingly 
however, the group test on the logarithm of GDP (with both an intercept and trend) 
resulted in a test statistic of 1.01 and indicated the presence of a unit root. As a result, 
the GDP variable had to enter our model in first differences. Therefore the empirical 
specification of (1) is given by: 
j
it i it it
j
p it p
j
it
j
it
j
it POP GDP y y y y ε α β β δ δ δ β + + + Δ + + + + + = − − − − − 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 ln ln ..  
where  1 ln − Δ it GDP  represents the percentage change in GDP going from year t-2 to t-1 
and  1 ln − it POP  is the lag of the logarithm of population. All other variables are as 
defined previously.  
The model was estimated using the Blundell-Bond estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998). 
Note that the effect of population was found to be highly insignificant in all 
specifications and thus this variable was excluded. The results for both bilateral and 
multilateral aid are given in Table 1. 
We find that three lags of the dependent variable are needed to sufficiently capture the 
dynamics of the series for both types of bilateral aid. Multilateral aid however, shows 
more dependency on past aid allocations requiring an extra lag to encapsulate the 
autocorrelation in the series. The results overall suggest that higher amounts of aid 
allocated in the past also lead to higher allocations in the present. As expected, growth 
in GDP decreases the amount received in terms of both types of bilateral aid, but  
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particularly in the case of sector aid. Interestingly, the impact of a 1 per cent increase in 
GDP completely offsets the effect of growth in sector aid allocations over the previous 
three periods. Conversely, the impact of growth in GDP is found to have a statistically 
insignificant effect on the multilateral aid allocations. It is possible that multilateral aid 
allocations are determined more by political considerations at the international level 
than humanitarian need, hence the insignificant effect of GDP growth.  
Table 1 
Estimation results 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  error  P-value 
      
 Sector  aid 
Lag 1  0.3344  0.0909  0.0000 
Lag 2  0.3319  0.0589  0.0000 
Lag 3  0.2386  0.0525  0.0000 
ΔlnGDP -0.8892  0.2642  0.0010 
Constant -0.2645  0.3449  0.4430 
      
Hansen test   40.690    0.3960 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in d(
tor
it
sec ε
)      
AR(1) -3.5300    0.0000 
AR(2) -0.4300    0.6650 
AR(3) -0.6600    0.5060 
AR(4) 0.0200    0.9810 
      
 Programme  aid 
Lag 1  0.3984  0.0688  0.0000 
Lag 2  0.2911  0.0608  0.0000 
Lag 3  0.2372  0.0533  0.0000 
ΔlnGDP -0.5473  0.2977  0.0660 
Constant -0.1816  0.1944  0.3500 
      
Hansen test   38.000    0.5150 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in d(
programme
it ε
)      
AR(1) -4.0200    0.0000 
AR(2) 0.5200    0.6020 
AR(3) -1.7800    0.0750 
AR(4) 0.9900    0.3240 
      
 Multilateral  aid 
Lag 1  0.2261  0.1167  0.0530 
Lag 2  0.2277  0.0859  0.0080 
Lag 3  0.1748  0.0786  0.0260 
Lag 4  0.2389  0.0812  0.0030 
ΔlnGDP -0.3247  0.2603  0.2120 
Constant -0.5485  0.5644  0.3310 
      
Hansen test   39.460    0.3180 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in d(
tor
it
sec ε
)      
AR(1) -3.3900    0.0010 
AR(2) 0.0100    0.9940 
AR(3) -0.2500    0.8030 
AR(4) -1.0900    0.2750 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates.  
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Table 2 
Estimated average conditional volatility 
  Average conditional aid volatility 
Country Multilateral  Programme  Sector 
      
Anguilla 0.6150  0.1626  0.2724 
Antigua & Barbuda  0.4987  0.2417  0.2535 
Aruba 0.6806  0.4023  0.4464 
Bahamas 0.9498  0.7780  0.8374 
Barbados 0.2356  0.1500  0.1628 
Belize 0.3619  0.2019  0.2274 
Cape Verde  0.2578  0.0660  0.1014 
Comoros 0.3181  0.1358  0.1672 
Cook Islands  0.6157  0.3017  0.2563 
Cuba 0.5553  0.1905  0.2611 
Dominica 0.3074  0.1079  0.1918 
Dominican Republic  0.2424  0.0841  0.1219 
East Timor  0.4342  0.0475  0.1481 
Fiji 0.3889  0.1042  0.1194 
French Polynesia  0.6182  0.1697  0.2123 
Grenada 0.1953  0.1633  0.1620 
Guinea-Bissau 0.3123  0.1106  0.1207 
Guyana 0.3566  0.1583  0.1525 
Haiti 0.1924  0.0687  0.0801 
Jamaica 0.1503  0.0501  0.0762 
Kiribati 0.3975  0.1922  0.2538 
Maldives 0.4571  0.0957  0.1556 
Marshall Islands  0.4159  0.1364  0.2511 
Mauritius 0.1889  0.0927  0.0957 
Micronesia 0.5922  0.1708  0.2560 
Montserrat 0.4998  0.1432  0.1678 
Nauru 0.1093  0.4286  0.3580 
Netherlands Antilles  0.3582  0.2434  0.2516 
New Caledonia  0.7032  0.1474  0.1561 
Palau   –  0.1590  0.2335 
Papua New Guinea  0.1419  0.0534  0.0701 
Samoa 0.2062  0.0931  0.1221 
Sao Tome & Principe  0.3053  0.1275  0.2048 
Seychelles 0.3880  0.0757  0.0976 
Singapore   –  0.3489  0.3661 
Solomon Islands  0.5577  0.1923  0.2098 
St Kitts-Nevis  0.5683  0.1371  0.1786 
St Lucia  0.4905  0.2980  0.3831 
St Vincent & Grenadines  0.2717  0.1755  0.1570 
Suriname 0.2765  0.1694  0.1260 
Tonga 0.3241  0.1205  0.1597 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.2506  0.2966  0.3367 
Tuvalu 0.6445  0.2043  0.2916 
Vanuatu 0.3226  0.0961  0.1342 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
The diagnostics associated with the estimated models indicate that there has been no 
violation of the dynamic panel assumptions. The Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions suggests that there is no endogeneity bias present in the models which  
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means that the effects of the included regressors have not been under or over estimated. 
The Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test on the other hand indicates that there is no serial 
correlation in the error term 
j
it ε  (Arellano and Bond 1991).6 This is essential to our 
analysis, given that we require that pure shocks be random and not be correlated. 
The estimates of the average conditional volatility ( T
t
j
it / ) ˆ (
2 ∑ ε ) for the small island 
states in our sample are given in Table 2.  
In the next step of our exercise, we model the extracted conditional volatility and retain 
the panel structure of the data. It is important to note that our methodology could 
accommodate country or donor characteristics if these were readily available for the 
small island states. The approach that we adopt stems from the notion that conditional 
volatility is time-varying. To illustrate this, consider the graph given in Figure 1, which 
plots the extracted conditional volatility for Belize versus its time average. As can be 
seen, there are considerable fluctuations in volatility over time. The graphs associated 
with the remaining countries for all three types of aid are given in Appendix B. 
Figure 1 
Conditional (programme) aid volatility - Belize 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
3.4 Modelling  conditional aid volatility 
The conditional aid volatility models for the three different types of aid were estimated 
using the Blundell-Bond estimator and the results are provided in Table 2. There is 
some evidence (Fielding and Mavrotas 2005) to show that certain regions are more 
susceptible to higher volatility, therefore we include regional indicators for whether the 
                                                 
6  The fact that there is autocorrelation of order 1 does not violate any assumptions. The test itself is 
performed on the differenced error term d(
j
it ε ) = 
j
it ε -
j
it 1 − ε  and therefore serial correlation of order 1 
is to be expected since d(
j
it ε ) = 
j
it ε -
j
it 1 − ε  and d(
j
it 1 − ε ) = 
j
it 1 − ε -
j
it 2 − ε  share a common term. 
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country is in the Asia-Pacific region, Africa or the Americas as controls. The 
diagnostics show that the models are well-specified. For sector and programme aid, we 
find significant regional effects which may perhaps be capturing certain donor-related 
characteristics.7 For instance, the two major donors to countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region are Australia (which on average was responsible for over 60 per cent of aid flows 
over the total period) and Japan (averaging 14 per cent). There are only three other 
donors to the Pacific of any note—the UK, France and the US (all averaging less than 
10 per cent of aid flows between 1973 and 2004). Whereas the small island countries in 
the Americas are far more likely to be dependent on aid from the US, those located in 
the African region have a stronger reliance on EU countries (see Vargas Hill 2005).  
As can be seen from Table 4, we find that relative to the African countries, those in the 
Americas and the Asia-Pacific region are characterized with a higher degree of volatility 
in both types of bilateral aid. Certainly given the heavy reliance on Australia and Japan 
(both being responsible for three-quarters of total aid to the Pacific for the period 1973 
to 2004), this higher level of volatility is in line with the results of Fielding and 
Mavrotas (2005). However, the regional effects are found to be statistically insignificant 
in the model for the conditional volatility of multilateral aid. 
Our results furthermore show that multilateral aid is, on average, considerably more 
volatile than the two types of bilateral aid. This is given by the estimated constants 
which imply that the average conditional volatility of multilateral aid is three times that 
of programme aid and 2.5 times that of sector aid. Multilateral aid allocations are about 
one-third of sector and programme bilateral aid allocations over the whole of the small 
islands states (and just over 20 per cent of sector and programme bilateral aid 
allocations for Pacific island states). 
We also find evidence of autocorrelation and thus of persistence in volatility of sector 
and programme aid. This implies the presence of ‘volatility clustering’ where large 
changes in allocations of bilateral aid persist for a certain period of time, after which 
they are followed by a period of stable inflows. As can be seen from Table 3, both types 
of bilateral aid are characterized by approximately the same degree of persistence in 
volatility. In other words, the amount of time that it takes for the aid inflow to stabilize 
after a shock is the same for both sector and programme aid. While the degree of 
persistence that we observe is fairly small relative to that typically found for a financial 
time series, it does suggest that the effects of shocks to bilateral aid last for some time.  
The timeframe itself can be analysed using an impulse response function, which charts 
the impact of a past shock on the level of volatility going k periods into the future. The 
impulse response function associated with volatility of sector aid is given in Figure 2. It 
should however, be noted that since we find the same level of persistence in volatility 
both types of bilateral aid, the impulse response function given by Figure 2 is also 
reflective of the process for the programme aid. Figure 2 shows that the effect of a 
shock decreases dramatically after the first year. However it does not disappear 
completely until after 4-5 years. In other words, our analysis suggests that if or when the 
small island states experience periods of highly volatile (bilateral) aid, these tend to last 
up to 4-5 years before stabilizing. Given the evidence in the literature regarding the 
                                                 
7   Historical, political and geographical relationships to aid allocation are explored in further detail in 
Alesina and Dollar (2000).  
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detrimental effect of fluctuating aid allocations, experiencing 4 to 5 years of unstable 
aid can potentially have staggering effect on a country’s growth and development.  
Table 3  
Estimation results 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  error  P-value 
  Sector aid – conditional volatility 
Lag 1  0.1673  0.0591  0.0050 
Region      
Asia-Pacific   0.0730  0.0229  0.0010 
Americas 0.0801  0.0300  0.0080 
Constant 0.0964  0.0141  0.0000 
      
Hansen test   39.39    0.4980 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in d(
tor
it v
sec )     
AR(1) -3.3500    0.0000 
AR(2) 1.6000    0.1100 
AR(3) -1.3700    0.1710 
AR(4) -0.0300    0.9800 
     
  Programme aid – conditional volatility 
Lag 1  0.1612  0.0398  0.0000 
Region      
Asia-Pacific   0.0586  0.0231  0.0110 
Americas 0.0809  0.0371  0.0110 
Constant 0.0800  0.0125  0.0000 
   0.0177  0.0000 
      
Hansen test   39.20    0.5060 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in d(
programme
it v )     
AR(1) -2.9500    0.0030 
AR(2) 1.3800    0.1690 
AR(3) 0.2200    0.8240 
AR(4) -0.3100    0.7590 
  
  Multilateral aid – conditional volatility 
Lag 1  0.0859  0.0685  0.2090 
Region      
Asia-Pacific   0.1118  0.0685  0.1030 
Americas 0.0958  0.0559  0.0870 
Constant 0.2591  0.0389  0.0000 
      
Hansen test   37.35    0.4990 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in d(
programme
it v )     
AR(1) -3.2300    0.0010 
AR(2) -0.5200    0.6050 
AR(3) 0.7300    0.4660 
AR(4) -1.0800    0.2790 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
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Figure 2  
 Impulse response function: sector aid 
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Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
Persistence should not necessarily be viewed as a negative characteristic of conditional 
volatility. From a recipient’s viewpoint, the fact that past values affect the future levels 
of volatility implies a degree of predictability in bilateral aid inflows to small island 
states. Although as shown, the periods of high volatility are likely to persist, they can be 
anticipated once a large change in aid allocations occurs. In terms of the multilateral aid 
however, the results show no evidence of a significant persistence of volatility. Even 
though this implies that a large variation in aid inflow does not necessarily signal a 
period of high volatility, it also means that multilateral aid allocations are more 
unpredictable. In other words, a stable flow in one period does not necessarily imply 
that a stable flow in the next period as well. 
4  Analytical narrative of year-on-year variations in the Pacific 
Due to data constraints, specific analysis of aid allocation and aid volatility based on the 
previous methodology is not possible solely for the Pacific region. However, we believe 
that there is some value in further illustrating the variation in aid allocation and aid 
receipts by considering simple year-on-year variations. This analytical narrative 
discusses various features of year-on-year variation of aid allocations by the five major 
donors to the Pacific (Australia, Japan, France, UK and US) and the experiences of 16 
Pacific island aid recipient countries. 
Australia is the largest single donor to the Pacific region, allocating on average over 60 
per cent of total aid for the period 1973 to 2004. Australia’s largest year-on-year 
variation for total aid to the Pacific region occurred between 1994-96 when total aid fell 
from US$456 million (in 2003 prices) to just US$6 million in 1995 before jumping 
again to US$337 million (an increase of nearly 5,400 per cent!) (see Figure 3). There 
was a similar dramatic increase in 1974 when aid to the Pacific increased from US$13 
million to US$520 million—this was largely due to impending independence of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) and most probably reflects a change in accounting for assistance to 
PNG rather than an absolute increase in assistance. Other than this initial increase in 
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Figure 3 
Australian aid allocation to the Pacific region, 1973-2004 (US$2003, m.) 
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Figure 4 
Japanese, French, UK and US aid allocation to the Pacific region, 1973-2004 (US$2003, m.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
total aid to the region, year-on-year variations in the Australian aid allocation to the 
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immediate increases in subsequent year), aid from Australia to the Pacific still 
fluctuated on average by 55 per cent each year for the period 1987 to 2004.  
Year-on-year variations of total aid from France, Japan and UK were of similar 
magnitude to Australia (see Figure 4). For instance, France virtually cut all its aid to the 
Pacific in 1975, 1977, 1986 and 1988—with resumption of aid in the intermediate years. 
However, French aid has recently steadily reduced and is now at around 10 per cent of 
the aid provided to the region three decades ago (in real terms). The average   
year-on-year variation for French aid to the Pacific (excluding the period to 1979 in 
which French aid was characterized by its on-off allocation) was, as with Australian aid, 
around 55 per cent. On three occasions, Japanese aid to the Pacific was cut by between 
half and three-quarters from one year to the next, with the average year-on-year variation 
between 1974 and 2004 being 77 per cent. The UK has reduced its aid to the Pacific from 
1980s to the present. The average aid allocation for the period 1973 to 1982 (whilst the 
UK still allocated a reasonable level of aid to the Pacific) was around US$80 million and 
year-on-year variation during this period averaged just below 40 per cent. The UK 
allocated an average of only US$10 million between 1983 and 2004. The US did not 
allocated significant aid to the Pacific until 1999, after which it average an allocation of 
US$158 million, with a small year-on-year variation of less than 10 per cent. 
Table 4 
Coefficient of variation of aid allocated by major donors to Pacific island countries, 1973-2004 
Country  Total bilateral aid  Sector aid  Programme aid 
    
United States  2.034261 2.506224  0.534433 
United Kingdom  1.343141  1.3726  0.780617 
Japan 0.766809  0.799708  2.959481 
France 0.650288  0.67085    NA 
Australia 0.482856  1.090147    0.920026 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
Table 5   
Coefficient of variation of total aid received by Pacific island countries, 1973-2004 
Country  CV for 1973-2004 
  
Palau 1.958279 
Micronesia 1.785031 
Nauru 1.472914 
Cook Islands  0.993695 
Kiribati 0.904458 
East Timor  0.897083 
French Polynesia  0.808023 
Marshall Islands  0.803424 
Solomon Islands  0.719717 
Fiji 0.677183 
Tuvalu 0.659515 
Tonga 0.591064 
New Caledonia  0.585015 
Vanuatu 0.578391 
Samoa 0.531411 
Papua New Guinea  0.46392 
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The United States and United Kingdom display the greatest level of volatility of total 
aid allocations to the Pacific for the period 1973 to 2004, whereas Australia, France and 
Japan show the lowest volatility over this time. However, in sector aid allocations, 
Australia’s volatility increases but Japan and France’s levels remain at similar levels. 
Again, the US and UK display similarly high levels of volatility to that of total aid. 
However, for programme aid, only Japan has a high level of coefficient of variation and 
this is largely because of its spasmodic allocation of programme aid. 
While volatility of aid allocations from Australia, Japan and France to the Pacific as a 
whole may be at reasonable levels, this may betray higher levels of volatility within the 
region for specific countries. Allocations of aid internally to the Pacific may be much 
higher as aid allocations to Pacific countries vary greatly on a year to year basis. For 
example, Australia (or Japan or France) may transfer aid from one country another, year 
by year, whilst keeping the total allocation to the region relatively stable. This is better 
illustrated in Table 5. 
In terms of aid receipts in the Pacific, the country that recorded the single greatest year-
on-year variation was Nauru in 1994, whose aid receipts increased nearly 80,000 per 
cent (from US$0.05 million to US$39 million—and back again to US$0.04 million in 
 
Table 6 
Reduction in aid receipts of Pacific countries 
Country 
Reduction of more than 
90% of aid receipts 
Reduction of between 
75-90% of aid receipts 
Reduction of between 
50-75% of aid receipts 
    
Cook Islands  1984, 1986  1979, 1988, 1989, 1991, 
1993 
1997, 2000 
East Timor       
Fiji    1976, 1979, 1989  1997, 1999, 2000 
French Polynesia      1975, 1978, 1988, 1989
Kiribati  1992  2002  1974, 1978, 1984, 1986, 
1994, 1998 
Marshall Islands  1998     
Micronesia 1995,  1998    1993 
Nauru  1995  1997, 1999, 2000   
New Caledonia  1975, 1977, 1986  1988   
Palau   1998,  2000   
Papua New Guinea  1995  1989  1975, 2001 
Samoa    1974, 1982  1976, 1986, 1991, 1996
Solomon Islands  1975  1979, 1985  1981, 1983, 1995, 1997, 
2001 
Tonga    1998  1979, 1984, 1985, 1989
Tuvalu    1989, 1997, 2000  1979, 1987, 2002 
Vanuatu   1975,  1990  1981, 1984, 1995, 1997, 
1999 
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Australia). Other extraordinary one-off increases included a 40,000 percentage increase 
in Micronesia’s aid receipts from 1998 to 1999 (following an almost cessation of aid to 
Micronesia in 1998). As was the case with Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1974, total aid 
to the newly independent Eat Timor increased dramatically in 1998 and 1999—from 
US$0.01 million in 1997 to US$221 million in 1999. 
On 17 separate occasions (between 1974 and 2004), a Pacific island country had its total 
aid receipts reduced by over 90 per cent (see Table 6). On another 27 instances, Pacific 
island countries had their aid receipts reduced by between 75 to 90 per cent, and on 41 
further occasions, the aid receipts were reduced by between 50 and 75 per cent from the 
proceeding year. Indeed, in only three years (1980, 2003, and 2004) has a fall in total 
aid receipts of more than 50 per cent not been experienced by any Pacific country. (In 
1980, Samoa’s total aid was reduced by 41 per cent, in 2003 PNG’s total aid was cut by 
a quarter, and in 2004 Vanuatu’s total aid was reduced by 46 per cent). 
5  Policy implications  
Aid volatility occurs when a recipient country receives differing levels of aid from year 
to year. The conclusions of the aid volatility literature are relatively clear and robust—
large year-on-year changes in aid flows have deleterious effects on economic growth 
and poverty alleviation Lensink and Morrissey (2001). This paper finds that for the 44 
small island states analysed, bilateral aid volatility in one year has a persistent effect in 
future years and that volatility in the Pacific is widespread. Further, multilateral aid is 
more volatile than both sector (2.5 times more) and programme (3  times more) aid 
allocations. These findings have important policy implications. 
Shocks to aid flows are not isolated. The impacts of a single shock carry forward and 
affect aid allocations for the following four to five years. Therefore aid receipts bounce 
around following an aid shock and if another aid shock follows within this period, the 
inconsistency of aid flows continues to be exacerbated. While all regions analysed were 
susceptible to aid volatility, the Asia-Pacific and Americas regions were characterized 
by a higher degree of volatility than Africa. This, however, was particularly evident in 
the Pacific, with a large number of examples in which aid allocation virtually ceased 
from one year to the next before being re-established at previous levels a year later. This 
staccato effect is quite the opposite of stable aid flows suggested by the literature as 
being beneficial for aid recipients. Both donors and recipients (especially for the Asia-
Pacific and Americas regions) must work in cooperation to reduce aid shocks and seek a 
more consistent flow of aid to achieve more optimal outcomes. This also means that aid 
allocation must be considered at the country level, rather than at a region level so not to 
mask intraregional volatility. 
Consideration of the causes of aid volatility is therefore very important. Aid volatility 
has been analysed (in the same vein as the general aid effectiveness literature) by 
focusing on factors exogenous to the donor country. For example, Fielding and 
Mavrotas (2005) suggest that the size of aid flows, per capita income, institutional 
quality, and the governing policy regime may all affect the uncertainty of aid flows. 
Levin and Dollar (2005: 6) use a similar approach, ‘aid flows to DPCs (difficult 
partnership countries) are more volatile than those to other aid recipients; however, this 
volatility is explained by the more unstable political climate of DPCs and its greater  
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preponderance for vacillation between conflict and peace’. Aid volatility is therefore 
again being explained by factors exogenous to the donor. In this way, recipient 
countries are (implicitly) being held responsible for aid volatility. 
Whilst recipient countries can make themselves attractive (or unattractive) to donors, 
the ultimate decision on aid allocation lies solely with donors—not recipients. 
Ultimately, aid volatility is therefore a function of the decisions taken by donors in 
committing and then disbursing their aid. Analysing aid volatility by focussing on 
factors that are exogenous to the donor might therefore be insufficient. It may be that 
factors endogenous to the donor might offer greater explanation of aid volatility. Levin 
and Dollar’s (2005: 23) claim of donors always acting ‘rationally’ in determining aid 
and reacting ‘to improvements or deteriorations in recipient countries’ policy climate 
and, as we discussed before, to countries coming out of conflict by increasing or 
decreasing aid allocations’ must be questioned.  
Certainly a wider8 explanation of the unpredictability of aid flows should be sought in 
which its responsibility is not laid at the feet of whom it may not belong—the poor. 
Determining if particular donors are predictably unpredictable in their aid disbursements 
is required to develop this aid volatility literature. Following this, a study of factors 
endogenous to donors may be useful to gain additional information than that that may 
be gained on aid volatility by seeking explanations solely through factors exogenous to 
donors. Acknowledgement of this imperative exists within the Rome Declaration of Aid 
Harmonization in 2003 and the Paris Declaration of Aid effectiveness in 2005. As 
Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) finally note, the speedy implementation of these 
initiatives is required to improve aid effectives, and as this paper highlights, this 
includes Small island countries. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the variations in sector and programme aid allocated to 44 
small island states over the period 1973 to 2004. Two exercises were undertaken to 
understand this variation. First, an econometric technique was applied to all 44 
countries. This approach found that past aid flows are correlated with present aid flows 
so that aid shocks result in the persistence of volatility for a number of years before 
stabilizing, and that volatility on both sector and programme aid in the Americas and 
Asia-Pacific region are characterized by a higher degree of volatility than small islands 
states in the African region. Second, an analytical narrative of year-on-year variation of 
aid allocations to the Pacific region was undertaken. This analysis considered aid 
allocation of the five largest aid donors to the Pacific as well as the experiences of 16 
aid-receiving Pacific island countries. This methodology illustrated the staccato 
characteristics of aid flows to this region. 
This paper argues that greater consideration of variable endogenous to the aid donor 
must be considered to explain aid variations. Aid is more effective if its flows are 
certain. Small island countries have not experienced this certainty over the past three 
decades. Donors and recipients must work together to reverse this experience. 
                                                 
8  See Fielding, McGillivray and Torres (2006).  
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Appendix Table A1 
Descriptive statistics – original aid data 
Sector Aid   Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.   Skew.   Kurt.  JB Stat  P-value  N 
Nauru  0.0084 0.0000 0.1574 0.0000 0.0286 4.6670  24.5603  735.9594 0.0000  32 
Barbados  0.0061 0.0013 0.0750 0.0001 0.0138 4.1365  20.7112 509.5032  0.0000  32 
Mauritius 0.0169  0.0124  0.1134 0.0005 0.0199 3.7237 18.6194  399.2391  0.0000  32 
Bahamas  0.0001 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003 3.6808  17.4620 351.1255  0.0000  32 
Kiribati  0.2188 0.1450 1.4470 0.0120 0.2604 3.4634  16.6942 314.0136  0.0000  32 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.0017  0.0005  0.0156  0.0000 0.0031 3.3767  14.6446 241.6041  0.0000  32 
St Lucia  0.0003  0.0002  0.0019 0.0000 0.0004 3.1592 14.6028  232.7288  0.0000  32 
Palau  0.0270 0.0000 0.2899 0.0000 0.0604 3.0720  12.7587  177.3065 0.0000  32 
Singapore  0.0365 0.0024 0.3808 0.0000 0.0871 2.9846  10.9801 132.4163  0.0000  32 
Montserrat  0.2154 0.0546 1.7469 0.0000 0.3668 2.7364  10.9672 124.5679  0.0000  32 
Micronesia  0.0457 0.0000 0.3953 0.0000 0.0865 2.4505 9.5294 88.8694  0.0000  32 
Antigua & Barbuda  0.0178  0.0085  0.1044  0.0000 0.0283 2.3505 7.2682 53.7550  0.0000  32 
Aruba  0.0018 0.0000 0.0140 0.0000 0.0039 2.1834 6.4459  41.2583 0.0000  32 
Anguilla  0.0569 0.0389 0.2944 0.0000 0.0707 2.1247 7.4979 51.0519  0.0000  32 
St  Kitts-Nevis  0.0133 0.0059 0.0785 0.0000 0.0202 2.1051 6.4488 39.4919  0.0000  32 
Belize  0.0402 0.0224 0.2033 0.0030 0.0487 2.0999 6.4050  38.9768 0.0000  32 
Marshall  Islands  0.0625 0.0000 0.4737 0.0000 0.1159 2.0890 6.7424 41.9473  0.0000  32 
Fiji  0.0122 0.0094 0.0500 0.0001 0.0100 2.0051 7.6141  49.8295 0.0000  32 
St Vincent & Grenadines  0.0301  0.0223  0.1495 0.0000 0.0339 1.9421 6.7564 38.9311  0.0000  32 
Cape  Verde  0.1113 0.1025 0.4009 0.0000 0.0726 1.8978 9.1279 69.2763  0.0000  32 
Grenada  0.0298 0.0206 0.1149 0.0003 0.0295 1.7549 5.2716  23.3045 0.0000  32 
Comoros  0.0996 0.0799 0.3931 0.0000 0.0904 1.7465 5.8869 27.3808  0.0000  32 
Dominican  Republic  0.0092 0.0070 0.0310 0.0028 0.0066 1.7439 5.5641 24.9861  0.0000  32 
East  Timor  0.4577 0.5469 0.5949 0.0050 0.2079  -1.7308 4.4503 4.1083 0.1282  7 
Samoa  0.1564 0.1137 0.5335 0.0206 0.1302 1.6736 5.1558  21.1345 0.0000  32 
Tonga 0.1001  0.0872  0.3539 0.0000 0.0697 1.5759 6.5416 29.9694  0.0000  32 
Vanuatu 0.0805  0.0750  0.2673 0.0083 0.0549 1.5084 5.7309 22.0793  0.0000  32 
Sao Tome & Principe  0.0314  0.0269  0.1298  0.0000 0.0296 1.5080 5.4527 20.1494  0.0000  32 
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Appendix Table A1 (con’t) 
Descriptive statistics – original aid data 
Sector aid   Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.   Skew.   Kurt.  JB Stat  P-value  N 
Tuvalu  0.3156 0.2094 1.1429 0.0000 0.2977 1.4142 4.3571 13.1218  0.0014  32 
Netherlands Antilles  0.0154  0.0021  0.0788  0.0000 0.0216 1.3927 3.9814 11.6284  0.0030  32 
Cook  Islands  0.0307 0.0247 0.1191 0.0000 0.0316 1.3306 4.5155 12.5041  0.0019  32 
Jamaica  0.0165 0.0109 0.0500 0.0014 0.0125 1.3071 3.7718 9.9064 0.0071  32 
Papua New Guinea  0.0323  0.0221  0.1081  0.0013 0.0277 1.1710 3.5193 7.6731 0.0216  32 
Seychelles  0.0480 0.0326 0.1591 0.0000 0.0446 1.1557 3.3325 7.2703 0.0264  32 
Solomon  Islands  0.5279 0.3528 1.6657 0.0130 0.4179 1.0173 3.1707 5.5582 0.0621  32 
Guyana  0.0809 0.0641 0.2472 0.0037 0.0702 0.9715 3.0994 5.0471 0.0802  32 
Haiti  0.0525 0.0496 0.1268 0.0135 0.0231 0.9360 4.7499 8.7553 0.0126  32 
Guinea-Bissau  0.1739 0.1449 0.4370 0.0000 0.1138 0.8120 3.3215 3.6541 0.1609  32 
Suriname  0.0481 0.0359 0.1660 0.0000 0.0485 0.8097 2.5368 3.7823 0.1509  32 
Cuba  0.0008 0.0004 0.0030 0.0000 0.0009 0.7795 2.5799 3.4760 0.1759  32 
New  Caledonia  0.0086 0.0088 0.0292 0.0000 0.0073 0.7004 3.2826 2.7227 0.2563  32 
Dominica  0.0555 0.0400 0.1446 0.0052 0.0408 0.6872 2.2656 3.2378 0.1981  32 
Maldives  0.0504 0.0454 0.1367 0.0000 0.0371 0.6079 2.5887 2.1966 0.3334  32 
French  Polynesia  0.0066 0.0068 0.0202 0.0000 0.0057 0.5978 2.6317 2.0867 0.3523  32 
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Appendix Table A2 
Descriptive statistics – original aid data – PROGRAMME AID 
Programme aid   Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.   Skew.   Kurt.  JB Stat  P-value  N 
Barbados  0.0068 0.0019 0.0751 0.0001 0.0138 4.0125  20.0047 471.4105  0.0000  32 
Mauritius 0.0199  0.0150  0.1271 0.0016 0.0223 3.6120 18.0468  371.4571  0.0000  32 
Seychelles  0.0959 0.0549 0.8039 0.0004 0.1502 3.5684  16.7973 321.7327  0.0000  32 
Kiribati  0.2572 0.1844 1.4647 0.0280 0.2594 3.2911  15.8544 278.0801  0.0000  32 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.0018  0.0009  0.0156  0.0000 0.0032 3.1075  12.9309 182.9978  0.0000  32 
Aruba  0.0038 0.0000 0.0418 0.0000 0.0089 2.9834  12.0742  157.2588 0.0000  32 
Singapore  0.0366 0.0024 0.3814 0.0000 0.0872 2.9812  10.9663 132.0183  0.0000  32 
St  Kitts-Nevis  0.0232 0.0081 0.1939 0.0003 0.0418 2.8657  11.0337 129.8543  0.0000  32 
Bahamas  0.0002 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003 2.8549  10.7940 124.4628  0.0000  32 
Nauru  0.0674 0.0000 0.7083 0.0000 0.1531 2.7520  10.9145  123.9112 0.0000  32 
Montserrat  0.3086 0.0946 2.2513 0.0024 0.4756 2.5678  10.0313 101.0841  0.0000  32 
St Vincent & Grenadines  0.0436  0.0305  0.2461 0.0010 0.0496 2.4198 9.8564 93.9091  0.0000  32 
Cook  Islands  0.0513 0.0322 0.3074 0.0000 0.0698 2.3346 8.1003 63.7525  0.0000  32 
Palau  0.0454 0.0000 0.3857 0.0000 0.0896 2.2550 7.9083  59.2427 0.0000  32 
St Lucia  0.0004  0.0003  0.0019 0.0000 0.0004 2.2243 8.8906  72.6529 0.0000  32 
Antigua & Barbuda  0.0203  0.0108  0.1047  0.0000 0.0290 2.0909 6.1236 36.3264  0.0000  32 
Fiji  0.0135 0.0104 0.0509 0.0034 0.0099 1.9957 7.6266  49.7813 0.0000  32 
Grenada  0.0446 0.0280 0.2025 0.0027 0.0441 1.9601 6.6947  38.6913 0.0000  32 
Anguilla  0.0896 0.0487 0.4085 0.0000 0.1021 1.7054 5.3501 22.8745  0.0000  32 
Suriname  0.0777 0.0520 0.3611 0.0022 0.0807 1.6982 6.0366 27.6752  0.0000  32 
Samoa  0.1646 0.1168 0.5516 0.0210 0.1310 1.6973 5.3275  22.5877 0.0000  32 
Haiti  0.0717 0.0651 0.1893 0.0259 0.0321 1.6079 6.9169  34.2446 0.0000  32 
Dominican  Republic  0.0118 0.0093 0.0354 0.0029 0.0087 1.5435 4.4322 15.4401  0.0004  32 
Marshall  Islands  0.1185 0.0000 0.6062 0.0000 0.2102 1.5165 3.5591 12.6831  0.0018  32 
Micronesia  0.0986 0.0000 0.5144 0.0000 0.1784 1.5030 3.5038 12.3861  0.0020  32 
Cape  Verde  0.1729 0.1678 0.5526 0.0000 0.1000 1.5008 7.8805 43.7719  0.0000  32 
Belize  0.0534 0.0306 0.2087 0.0031 0.0549 1.4779 4.0734  13.1853 0.0014  32 
Comoros  0.1195 0.0922 0.3931 0.0098 0.0923 1.4037 4.7809 14.7376  0.0006  32 
          Appendix  Table  A2  continues
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Appendix Table A2 (con’t) 
Descriptive statistics – original aid data – PROGRAMME AID 
Programme aid   Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.   Skew.   Kurt.  JB Stat  P-value  N 
Tonga 0.1150  0.0947  0.3716 0.0000 0.0733 1.3175 5.7429 19.2893  0.0001  32 
Vanuatu 0.1229  0.1072  0.3458 0.0184 0.0674 1.2636 5.4528 16.5374  0.0003  32 
East  Timor  0.5707 0.6251 0.8631 0.0055 0.2772  -1.2609 3.6397 1.9742 0.3727  7 
Guyana  0.1240 0.0985 0.4799 0.0039 0.1127 1.2327 4.3913  10.6845 0.0048  32 
Solomon  Islands  0.6893 0.5034 2.0610 0.0603 0.5764 1.2097 3.4472 8.0711 0.0177  32 
Tuvalu  0.4428 0.4017 1.4273 0.0000 0.3634 1.1466 3.8113 7.8895 0.0194  32 
Netherlands Antilles  0.0183  0.0052  0.0788  0.0000 0.0234 1.0920 2.9179 6.3687 0.0414  32 
Jamaica  0.0313 0.0211 0.1010 0.0020 0.0223 1.0219 3.8870 6.6190 0.0365  32 
Guinea-Bissau  0.2740 0.2238 0.7969 0.0026 0.1827 0.9931 3.7431 5.9961 0.0499  32 
Sao Tome & Principe  0.0440  0.0375  0.1336  0.0000 0.0320 0.7929 3.3139 3.4846 0.1751  32 
New  Caledonia  0.0087 0.0092 0.0293 0.0000 0.0073 0.6641 3.2668 2.4470 0.2942  32 
Maldives  0.0579 0.0518 0.1427 0.0000 0.0378 0.5418 2.6065 1.7722 0.4123  32 
French  Polynesia  0.0076 0.0081 0.0203 0.0000 0.0062 0.5167 2.4487 1.8291 0.4007  32 
Cuba  0.0011 0.0011 0.0032 0.0000 0.0010 0.4253 1.8661 2.6788 0.2620  32 
Dominica  0.0877 0.0824 0.1866 0.0079 0.0484 0.2471 2.0802 1.4538 0.4834  32 
Papua New Guinea  0.0706  0.0688  0.1461  0.0038 0.0331 0.1428 3.0806 0.1174 0.9430  32 
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Appendix Table A3 
Descriptive statistics – original aid data – MUTILATERAL AID 
Multilateral aid    Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  JB Stat.  P-value  N 
Anguilla  0.0046 0.0000 0.0395 0.0000 0.0106 2.2953 6.7491 46.8393  0.0000  32 
Antigua & Barbuda  0.0012  0.0004  0.0080  0.0000 0.0022 2.1440 6.2449 38.5553  0.0000  32 
Aruba  0.0003 0.0000 0.0045 0.0000 0.0010 3.5659  14.4851  243.6943 0.0000  32 
Bahamas  0.0001 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003 2.8293  10.6175 120.0628  0.0000  32 
Barbados  0.0033 0.0006 0.0246 0.0000 0.0058 2.3833 8.0558 64.3745  0.0000  32 
Belize  0.0044 0.0016 0.0196 0.0000 0.0055 1.2755 3.8395 9.6166 0.0082  32 
Cape  Verde  0.0579 0.0567 0.3029 0.0000 0.0561 2.5727  12.4183 153.5737  0.0000  32 
Comoros  0.0663 0.0466 0.2123 0.0000 0.0629 0.8857 2.7816 4.2478 0.1196  32 
Cook  Islands  0.0127 0.0000 0.0780 0.0000 0.0221 1.7572 5.0004 21.8028  0.0000  32 
Cuba  0.0002 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0003 1.2771 3.0254 8.6995 0.0129  32 
Dominica  0.0292 0.0247 0.1046 0.0000 0.0297 0.7569 2.5664 3.3060 0.1915  32 
Dominican  Republic  0.0049 0.0023 0.0289 0.0000 0.0074 2.3416 7.6914 58.5888  0.0000  32 
East  Timor  0.0567 0.0672 0.1309 0.0026 0.0429 0.4461 2.3630 0.3505 0.8392  7 
Fiji  0.0032 0.0012 0.0213 0.0000 0.0047 2.2882 8.3795  66.5106 0.0000  32 
French  Polynesia  0.0003 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0006 2.8017  11.9917 149.6661  0.0000  32 
Grenada  0.0140 0.0120 0.0444 0.0000 0.0116 0.6150 2.7134 2.1268 0.3453  32 
Guinea-Bissau  0.1150 0.0862 0.3837 0.0000 0.1048 1.2899 3.9519 10.0814  0.0065  32 
Guyana  0.0642 0.0344 0.3497 0.0000 0.0776 1.8245 6.8757  37.7817 0.0000  32 
Haiti  0.0320 0.0265 0.1149 0.0000 0.0269 1.3850 4.7549  14.3374 0.0008  32 
Jamaica  0.0051 0.0058 0.0105 0.0000 0.0034  -0.0713 1.8069 1.9251 0.3819  32 
Kiribati  0.0481 0.0227 0.2673 0.0000 0.0650 1.7885 5.6956 26.7481  0.0000  32 
Maldives  0.0194 0.0081 0.0774 0.0000 0.0239 1.0706 3.0943 6.1251 0.0468  32 
Marshall  Islands  0.0191 0.0000 0.1684 0.0000 0.0416 2.1887 7.0082 46.9682  0.0000  32 
Mauritius 0.0054  0.0025  0.0393 0.0000 0.0077 2.9340 12.9743  178.5597  0.0000  32 
Micronesia  0.0068 0.0000 0.1289 0.0000 0.0253 4.0803  19.0140 430.7242  0.0000  32 
Montserrat  0.0127 0.0000 0.2072 0.0000 0.0412 3.9330  17.8600 376.9252  0.0000  32 
Nauru  0.0051 0.0000 0.1630 0.0000 0.0288 5.3882  30.0323  1129.1630  0.0000  32 
Netherlands Antilles  0.0018  0.0001  0.0253  0.0000 0.0047 4.2356  21.2862 541.5271  0.0000  32 
New  Caledonia  0.0004 0.0000 0.0029 0.0000 0.0008 1.8037 5.3276 24.5752  0.0000  32 
          Appendix  Table  A3  continues 
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Appendix Table A3 (con’t) 
Descriptive statistics – original aid data – MUTILATERAL AID 
Multilateral aid    Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  JB Stat.  P-value  N 
Papua New Guinea  0.0095  0.0094  0.0259  0.0000 0.0067 0.4500 2.6320 1.2606 0.5324  32 
Sao Tome & Principe  0.0252  0.0116  0.1152  0.0000 0.0297 1.5295 4.6707 16.1976  0.0003 32 
Seychelles  0.0119 0.0036 0.1099 0.0000 0.0250 3.1770  12.1042 164.3443  0.0000  32 
Solomon  Islands  0.2166 0.0995 1.4397 0.0000 0.3323 2.5588 9.0702 84.0504  0.0000 32 
St  Kitts-Nevis  0.0015 0.0000 0.0100 0.0000 0.0029 1.7557 4.7423 20.4868  0.0000 32 
St Lucia  0.0001  0.0001  0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 1.5573 5.7057  22.6955 0.0000  32 
St Vincent & Grenadines  0.0199  0.0126  0.0927 0.0000 0.0245 1.3216 4.0638 10.8238  0.0045 32 
Suriname  0.0085 0.0037 0.0447 0.0000 0.0117 1.9017 5.6963 28.9816  0.0000 32 
Tonga 0.0352  0.0248  0.1283 0.0000 0.0342 0.9635 3.2266 5.0198 0.0813  32 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.0012  0.0004  0.0138  0.0000 0.0026 3.8582  18.4370 397.1237  0.0000  32 
Tuvalu  0.0513 0.0028 0.4612 0.0000 0.1005 2.5325 9.8659 97.0596  0.0000 32 
Vanuatu 0.0287  0.0156  0.1238 0.0000 0.0327 1.1573 3.6729 7.7466 0.0208  32 
Samoa  0.0857 0.0554 0.2954 0.0000 0.0840 1.1332 3.1557 6.8815 0.0320  32 
2
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Appendix Table A4 
Descriptive statistics – transformed aid data – SECTOR AID 
Sector aid  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std dev.  Skew. Sk-test  P-value Kurt.  JB  Stat  P-value  N 
Nauru -4.4855  -4.7849  -1.7970  -4.7849 0.6646 2.7019 6.2398 0.0000 10.1370  106.8505  0.0000  32 
Barbados  -4.6435 -4.8993 -2.5114 -5.0786  0.5752 2.0360 4.7019 0.0000 7.3354 47.1690  0.0000  32 
Singapore  -2.9261 -3.2479 -0.8739 -3.3103  0.6532 2.0043 4.6288 0.0000 6.0850 34.1155  0.0000  32 
Bahamas  -8.6657 -9.0416 -6.4136 -9.0416  0.6676 1.8555 4.2851 0.0000 5.6302 27.5856  0.0000  32 
Trinidad & Tobago  -5.9136  -6.1414  -4.0590  -6.4038 0.5507 1.7620 4.0691 0.0000 5.9751  28.3589 0.0000  32 
Palau  -3.2153 -3.6114 -1.1491 -3.6114  0.6645 1.6490 3.8082 0.0001 4.7904 18.7763  0.0001  32 
Aruba -5.9316  -6.3063  -4.1477  -6.3063 0.6957 1.6208 3.7432 0.0002 4.0839  15.5779 0.0004  32 
Mauritius -3.4807  -3.5304  -2.0383  -4.0543 0.3908 1.5652 3.6146 0.0003 6.8526  32.8549 0.0000  32 
Antigua & Barbuda  -3.5184  -3.6389  -2.1028  -4.0312 0.5386 1.4983 3.4602 0.0005 4.5643  15.2356 0.0005  32 
Kiribati -0.9249  -1.0124  0.5103  -1.4664 0.4050 1.4672 3.3884 0.0007 6.0591  23.9586 0.0000  32 
Belize -2.6386  -2.7715  -1.4127  -3.1432 0.4457 1.4372 3.3191 0.0009 4.1781  12.8671 0.0016  32 
Montserrat  -1.0445  -1.3095 0.6741  -1.5355 0.5726 1.3848 3.1980 0.0014 4.1133 11.8796  0.0026  32 
St  Kitts-Nevis  -3.8061 -3.9524 -2.3883 -4.3207 0.5447 1.3523 3.1231 0.0018 3.8069  10.6219 0.0049  32 
St  Lucia  -7.5069 -7.5841 -6.1204 -8.1020  0.4091 1.3123 3.0307 0.0024 5.4024 16.8805  0.0002  32 
Marshall  Islands  -2.3428 -2.7719 -0.6233 -2.7719 0.6591 1.2887 2.9761 0.0029 3.2783 8.9602 0.0113  32 
Micronesia  -2.6584 -3.0847 -0.8187 -3.0847  0.6643 1.2380 2.8590 0.0042 3.2160 8.2361 0.0163  32 
Dominican  Republic  -4.0495 -4.1274 -3.2150 -4.4272 0.3022 1.1422 2.6378 0.0083 3.6033 7.4435 0.0242  32 
Samoa -1.2275  -1.3090  -0.3711  -1.7313 0.3479 1.0312 2.3815 0.0172 3.3051 5.7958 0.0551  32 
Grenada -2.9108  -2.9885  -1.9332  -3.5032 0.4040 1.0130 2.3395 0.0193 3.3875 5.6733 0.0586  32 
Fiji -3.7795  -3.8381  -2.7782  -4.4013 0.3427 0.9209 2.1267 0.0334 3.8704 5.5330 0.0629  32 
East Timor  -0.1196  0.0045  0.0512 -0.7708  0.2934 -1.8708 -2.0207 0.0433 4.7752 5.0022 0.0820  7 
Anguilla  -2.3054 -2.3455 -1.0459 -2.8656  0.4916 0.8412 1.9426 0.0521 3.2785 3.8772 0.1439  32 
St Vincent & Grenadines  -2.9264  -2.9510  -1.7173  -3.5048 0.4598 0.8064 1.8622 0.0626 3.1841 3.5130 0.1727  32 
Comoros  -1.6922 -1.7181 -0.7079 -2.3069  0.3838 0.7907 1.8259 0.0679 3.2565 3.4218 0.1807  32 
Netherlands  Antilles  -3.6749 -4.0455 -2.3625 -4.1764 0.5954 0.7876 1.8189 0.0689 2.1538 4.2633 0.1186  32 
Jamaica  -3.4689 -3.5956 -2.7110 -4.0220  0.3344 0.7686 1.7749 0.0759 2.7488 3.2345 0.1984  32 
Tuvalu  -0.5496  -0.6448 0.3774  -1.1531 0.4153 0.5806 1.3408 0.1800 2.7553 1.8776 0.3911  32 
Seychelles  -2.4349 -2.5194 -1.5749 -3.0374  0.4193 0.5650 1.3048 0.1920 2.2728 2.4076 0.3000  32 
Vanuatu -1.8744  -1.8612  -1.0561  -2.4211 0.3067 0.5622 1.2984 0.1942 3.2191 1.7498 0.4169  32 
            Appendix  Table  A4  continues
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Appendix Table A4 (con’t) 
Descriptive statistics – transformed aid data – SECTOR AID 
Sector aid  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std dev.  Skew. Sk-test  P-value Kurt.  JB  Stat  P-value  N 
Papua New Guinea  -2.8185  -2.9128  -1.9634  -3.3946 0.3886 0.5554 1.2826 0.1996 2.3912 2.1391 0.3432  32 
Tonga -1.6589  -1.6752  -0.7897  -2.3017 0.3144 0.4757 1.0987 0.2719 3.3169 1.3410 0.5115  32 
Solomon Islands  -0.0138  -0.1272  0.7855  -0.6147  0.3662 0.4741 1.0949 0.2735 2.2256 1.9985 0.3682  32 
Sao Tome & Principe  -2.8603  -2.8451  -1.8251  -3.4623 0.4224 0.4319 0.9974 0.3186 2.6913 1.1218 0.5707  32 
Cook  Islands  -2.9009 -2.8958 -1.8987 -3.4832  0.4674 0.4048 0.9348 0.3499 2.2771 1.5706 0.4560  32 
Guyana -1.9045  -1.9312  -1.1143  -2.4693 0.4075 0.3593 0.8298 0.4067 2.0674 1.8483 0.3969  32 
Suriname  -2.4589 -2.4778 -1.5416 -3.0355  0.4850 0.3115 0.7194 0.4719 1.7103 2.7355 0.2547  32 
Cuba  -6.5636 -6.6840 -5.5605 -7.1177  0.5221 0.3082 0.7118 0.4766 1.5447 3.3305 0.1891  32 
Dominica  -2.2616 -2.3495 -1.6090 -2.8031  0.3560 0.2470 0.5705 0.5683 1.9626 1.7603 0.4147  32 
Cape  Verde  -1.5469 -1.5429 -0.6691 -2.1958  0.2974 0.2118 0.4891 0.6248 4.5165 3.3056 0.1915  32 
Haiti -2.2770  -2.2819  -1.7191  -2.7183 0.2138 0.1313 0.3031 0.7618 3.4089 0.3148 0.8544  32 
New  Caledonia  -4.1521 -4.0520 -3.2751 -4.7563  0.4347 -0.0947 -0.2188  0.8268 1.9649 1.4765 0.4780  32 
Maldives -2.3609  -2.3465  -1.6762 -2.9884  0.3707 -0.0526 -0.1215 0.9033 2.2254 0.8147 0.6654  32 
French  Polynesia  -4.4133 -4.3108 -3.6177 -5.0146  0.4396 -0.0120 -0.0277  0.9779 1.7765 1.9967 0.3685  32 
Guinea-Bissau  -1.1062 -1.1433 -0.4928 -1.7494  0.3217 0.0018 0.0041 0.9967 2.7677 0.0720 0.9647  32 
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Appendix Table A5 
Descriptive statistics – transformed aid data – PROGRAMME AID 
Programme aid   Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std Dev.   Skew.  Sk-test  P-value   Kurt.  JB Stat  P-value  N 
Singapore  -2.9215 -3.2444 -0.8722 -3.3066  0.6528 1.9976 4.6132 0.0000 6.0606 33.7718  0.0000  32 
Aruba -5.2162  -5.5825  -3.0878  -5.5825 0.6864 1.7952 4.1458 0.0000 4.9804  22.4176 0.0000  32 
Barbados  -4.5123 -4.7451 -2.5017 -4.9753  0.5597 1.7693 4.0859 0.0000 6.4368 32.4434  0.0000  32 
Bahamas  -8.4021 -8.7904 -6.3902 -8.7904  0.6701 1.7151 3.9608 0.0001 4.8106 20.0585  0.0000  32 
St  Kitts-Nevis  -3.2774 -3.4653 -1.5275 -3.7497 0.5615 1.7086 3.9458 0.0001 5.1252  21.5913 0.0000  32 
Trinidad & Tobago  -5.7902  -5.8920  -4.0484  -6.2982 0.5346 1.6645 3.8440 0.0001 5.4677  22.8959 0.0000  32 
Seychelles  -1.8007 -1.8921 -0.1055 -2.3400  0.4843 1.6453 3.7996 0.0001 6.0765 27.0570  0.0000  32 
Nauru -2.3339  -2.6969  -0.2540 -2.6969  0.7036  1.6413  3.7905  0.0002 4.2225  16.3606 0.0003  32 
Mauritius -3.3109  -3.3537  -1.9171 -3.8386  0.3840  1.4268  3.2951 0.0010 6.4171  26.4270 0.0000  32 
Palau  -2.6875 -3.0932 -0.8415 -3.0932  0.6788 1.3977 3.2280 0.0012 3.4592 10.7009  0.0047  32 
Antigua & Barbuda  -3.3650  -3.4721  -2.0798  -3.8996 0.5142 1.3729 3.1705 0.0015 4.0253  11.4537 0.0033  32 
Kiribati -0.7413  -0.8174  0.5434 -1.2548  0.3633  1.3628  3.1472  0.0016 5.9853  21.7876 0.0000  32 
Montserrat  -0.6577 -0.9084  0.9399 -1.1680  0.5392 1.3224 3.0541 0.0023 3.9484 10.5264  0.0052  32 
Micronesia  -1.9028 -2.3171 -0.4895 -2.3171  0.6826 1.2652 2.9219 0.0035 2.8450 8.5696 0.0138  32 
Marshall  Islands  -1.7069 -2.1326 -0.3219 -2.1326 0.6697 1.2523 2.8921 0.0038 2.8668 8.3880 0.0151  32 
Cook  Islands  -2.4224 -2.4840 -1.0255 -2.9710  0.4974 1.1971 2.7646 0.0057 3.9820 8.9288 0.0115  32 
Grenada -2.5035  -2.6226  -1.3980 -3.0505  0.3963  1.0712  2.4738  0.0134 3.5927 6.5883 0.0371  32 
Fiji -3.6606  -3.7338  -2.7422  -4.0775 0.3056 1.0494 2.4234 0.0154 3.9311 7.0286 0.0298  32 
Dominican  Republic  -3.7975 -3.8596 -3.0535 -4.2160 0.3140 1.0406 2.4032 0.0163 3.2295 5.8458 0.0538  32 
Samoa -1.1713  -1.2681  -0.3338 -1.6842  0.3344  1.0158  2.3459  0.0190 3.4373 5.7584 0.0562  32 
St Vincent & Grenadines  -2.5489  -2.6029  -1.2391  -3.1121 0.4402 0.9992 2.3074 0.0210 3.8152 6.2104 0.0448  32 
Belize -2.3366  -2.4769  -1.3388 -2.8735  0.4299  0.9208  2.1264  0.0335 2.7662 4.5946 0.1005  32 
St  Lucia  -7.2509 -7.3509 -6.0786 -7.8476  0.3991 0.9129 2.1083 0.0350 3.7467 5.1884 0.0747  32 
Anguilla  -1.8393 -1.9782 -0.6970 -2.4121  0.4714 0.8132 1.8781 0.0604 2.8872 3.5440 0.1700  32 
East Timor  0.0985  0.1789  0.3603  -0.5512 0.3029  -1.6057  -1.7343 0.0829 4.2514 3.4647 0.1769  7 
Haiti -1.9628  -1.9887  -1.3431 -2.3268  0.2042  0.7174  1.6568  0.0976 4.2660 4.8822 0.0871  32 
Netherlands  Antilles  -3.4765 -3.7479 -2.3315 -3.9996 0.5691 0.6645 1.5346 0.1249 1.8647 4.0736 0.1304  32 
Suriname  -1.9654 -2.0445 -0.8237 -2.5264  0.4437 0.6601 1.5243 0.1274 2.8043 2.3747 0.3050  32 
Solomon Islands  0.2487  0.1761  1.0117  -0.2882  0.3734 0.6499 1.5009 0.1334 2.4800 2.6133 0.2707  32 
           Appendix  Table  A5  continues
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Appendix Table A5 (con’t) 
Descriptive statistics – transformed aid data – PROGRAMME AID 
Programme aid   Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.   Skew.  Sk-test  P-value   Kurt.  JB Stat  P-value  N 
Papua New Guinea  -1.9862  -1.9706  -1.5292  -2.5990  0.2481 -0.6221 -1.4366  0.1508 3.5188 2.4227 0.2978  32 
Comoros  -1.4927 -1.5531 -0.6682 -2.0459  0.3454 0.5789 1.3369 0.1813 2.8717 1.8092 0.4047  32 
Guyana -1.4823  -1.5028  -0.5042 -2.0565  0.4178  0.4047  0.9346  0.3500 2.2570 1.6095 0.4472  32 
Jamaica  -2.8271 -2.9496 -2.0223 -3.4029  0.3352 0.3874 0.8946 0.3710 2.2084 1.6359 0.4413  32 
Tuvalu  -0.1946 -0.1691  0.6260 -0.8147  0.3819 0.3219 0.7433 0.4573 2.5760 0.7922 0.6729  32 
Vanuatu -1.4364  -1.4695  -0.7578 -1.9566  0.2579  0.2877  0.6643 0.5065 3.4972 0.7709 0.6801  32 
Tonga -1.5143  -1.5624  -0.7203  -2.1632 0.2981 0.2826 0.6526 0.5140 3.1799 0.4690 0.7910  32 
Dominica  -1.7783 -1.7713 -1.2933 -2.3474  0.2833 -0.1911 -0.4414  0.6589 2.1579 1.1404 0.5654  32 
Guinea-Bissau  -0.6515 -0.6975  0.0685 -1.2851  0.3188 0.1784 0.4120 0.6803 2.8406 0.2036 0.9032  32 
Maldives -2.2073  -2.2101  -1.6065 -2.8486  0.3302 -0.1284 -0.2966 0.7668 2.4680 0.4653 0.7924  32 
New  Caledonia  -4.1366 -4.0247 -3.2690 -4.7423  0.4319 -0.1271 -0.2934  0.7692 1.9575 1.5351 0.4641  32 
Cape Verde  -1.0990  -1.0765  -0.3208 -1.7548  0.2776 -0.1114 -0.2573 0.7970 4.5752 3.3744 0.1850  32 
French  Polynesia  -4.2703 -4.1572 -3.5794 -4.8812  0.4181 -0.1067 -0.2464  0.8053 1.9214 1.6119 0.4467  32 
Cuba  -6.2115 -6.1309 -5.4423 -6.7935  0.4709 0.0688 0.1588 0.8738 1.4347 3.2920 0.1928  32 
Sao Tome & Principe  -2.4938  -2.5073  -1.7283  -3.1245 0.3598 0.0133 0.0308 0.9754 2.4044 0.4740 0.7890  32 
 
2
9
  
 
Appendix Table A6 
Descriptive statistics – transformed aid data 
    Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.  Skew.  Sk-test  P-value   Kurtosis  JB Stat.  P-value  N 
Marshall  Islands  -5.1702 -5.2795 -1.7830 -5.2795 0.6181 5.3882  12.4434 0.0000 30.0323  1129.163  0.0000  32 
Kiribati  -4.7718 -4.9931 -1.9976 -4.9931  0.6947 3.1729 7.3276 0.0000  11.7681 156.1988  0.0000  32 
Aruba  -7.7878 -8.0830 -5.3458 -8.0830 0.6781 2.6954 6.2248 0.0000 9.2992  91.6534 0.0000  32 
Maldives  -4.0698 -4.3635 -1.5145 -4.3635  0.6762 2.6869 6.2052 0.0000 9.5471 95.6573  0.0000  32 
Mauritius  -5.9187 -6.2643 -3.6082  -6.3190 0.6221 2.0891 4.8246 0.0000 7.5086  50.3794 0.0000  32 
Seychelles  -3.9792 -4.1688 -2.1052 -4.4324  0.5826 1.9949 4.6070 0.0000 6.5712 38.2284  0.0000  32 
Tonga  -6.2902 -6.4653 -4.1997 -6.7403 0.5831 1.9742 4.5591 0.0000 6.8996  41.0619 0.0000  32 
Anguilla  -5.0315 -5.3852 -3.1227 -5.3852  0.6962 1.8952 4.3767 0.0000 4.9958 24.4667  0.0000  32 
Bahamas  -8.4635 -8.8296 -6.4043 -8.8296  0.6912 1.7317 3.9993 0.0001 4.7593 20.1213  0.0000  32 
Haiti  -3.5972 -3.9567 -1.6737  -3.9567 0.7141 1.5972 3.6887 0.0002 3.8632  14.5996 0.0007  32 
Antigua  &  Barbuda  -6.2858 -6.4626 -4.6876 -6.7342 0.6231 1.4784 3.4142 0.0006 4.0202  13.0448 0.0015  32 
Barbados  -5.2275 -5.5491 -3.5783 -5.7020  0.5935 1.4146 3.2669 0.0011 4.0117 12.0370  0.0024  32 
Tuvalu  -2.5512 -2.9169 -0.6686 -2.9708  0.6620 1.3907 3.2118 0.0013 3.5681 10.7457  0.0046  32 
Solomon  Islands  -1.0055 -1.1523  0.5046 -1.5297  0.5272 1.3585 3.1372 0.0017 4.4209  12.5339 0.0019  32 
St  Kitts-Nevis  -6.1047 -6.5044 -4.4663 -6.5044 0.6925 1.3431 3.1017 0.0019 3.0996 9.6339 0.0081  32 
Dominican  Republic  -4.7941 -4.9260 -3.3857 -5.3169 0.5329 1.2976 2.9966 0.0027 4.0718  10.5114 0.0052  32 
Micronesia  -7.3109 -7.7453 -5.6982 -7.7453  0.6600 1.2144 2.8044 0.0050 2.9058 7.8766 0.0195  32 
Jamaica  -4.6735 -4.8448 -3.1075 -5.2186  0.5025 1.1589 2.6764 0.0074 4.1546 8.9405 0.0114  32 
New  Caledonia  -7.5185 -7.9583 -5.7075 -7.9813  0.6207 1.1583 2.6749 0.0075 3.4608 7.4382 0.0243  32 
St Vincent & Grenadines  -4.2317  -4.4035  -2.9341  -4.7675 0.5225 1.1514 2.6590 0.0078 3.2814 7.1759 0.0277  32 
Comoros  -3.9267 -4.3648 -2.3999 -4.3648  0.6604 1.1327 2.6159 0.0089 2.7759 6.9097 0.0316  32 
Netherlands  Antilles  -5.2416 -5.4471 -3.7119 -5.7579 0.5519 1.1139 2.5724 0.0101 3.3833 6.8130 0.0332  32 
Cook  Islands  -8.2204 -8.6574 -6.8572 -8.6574  0.6730 1.0225 2.3613 0.0182 2.2438 6.3382 0.0420  32 
Guinea-Bissau  -2.5027 -2.6485 -1.1538 -3.0335  0.5417 0.8901 2.0556 0.0398 2.7936 4.2825 0.1175  32 
Sao Tome & Principe  -3.1202  -3.3008  -1.9635  -3.6804 0.4988 0.7325 1.6915 0.0907 2.5031 3.1905 0.2029  32 
Fiji  -2.1912 -2.3171 -0.8822 -2.7462 0.5102 0.6614 1.5273 0.1267 2.5202 2.6397 0.2672  32 
Belize  -4.8865 -5.1086 -3.7268  -5.4199 0.5534 0.5994 1.3843 0.1663 2.0010 3.2470 0.1972  32 
Samoa  -1.8639 -1.9587 -0.9648  -2.4566 0.4397 0.5970 1.3787 0.1680 2.2073 2.7387 0.2543  32 
Trinidad  &  Tobago  -3.3799 -3.4289 -2.1838 -3.9184 0.5454 0.5728 1.3227 0.1859 2.0827 2.8715 0.2379  32 
            Appendix  Table  A6  continues
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Appendix Table A6 (con’t) 
Descriptive statistics – transformed aid data 
    Mean   Median   Max   Min   Std dev.  Skew.  Sk-test  P-value   Kurtosis  JB Stat.  P-value  N 
East  Timor  -1.5556 -1.6034 -0.6957 -2.1628  0.4094 0.5046 1.1653 0.2439 2.5835 1.5893 0.4517  32 
Guyana  -3.4112 -3.6022 -2.3348  -3.9407 0.5663 0.4880 1.1269 0.2598 1.7861 3.2346 0.1984  32 
Grenada  -4.6512 -4.5182 -4.1596 -5.2738  0.3722 -0.4532 -1.0466 0.2953 1.8414 2.8850 0.2363  32 
Vanuatu  -2.9984 -3.1171 -1.8807  -3.5520 0.5239 0.4486 1.0361 0.3002 1.9245 2.6158 0.2704  32 
Nauru  -2.2421 -2.1673 -1.0194  -2.8495 0.4063 0.4438 1.0248 0.3054 3.8452 2.0027 0.3674  32 
French  Polynesia  -2.8231 -2.8397 -1.9181 -3.4427 0.3804 0.4209 0.9720 0.3311 2.8495 0.9749 0.6142  32 
St  Lucia  -8.4845 -8.3991 -7.2936 -9.0474  0.5055 0.4188 0.9673 0.3334 2.2721 1.6421 0.4400  32 
Cape  Verde  -2.1210 -2.1813 -1.2779 -2.7131  0.4509 0.3180 0.7344 0.4627 1.8967 2.1623 0.3392  32 
Suriname  -2.7580 -2.8124 -1.8105 -3.3455  0.4616 0.2849 0.6578 0.5106 1.9384 1.9354 0.3800  32 
Cuba  -2.9603 -2.9202 -2.0112 -3.5321  0.4983 0.2284 0.5274 0.5979 1.6480 2.7152 0.2573  32 
Montserrat  -4.0216 -3.9688 -3.3402 -4.6535  0.3611 -0.1839 -0.4246 0.6711 2.1131 1.2290 0.5409  32 
Dominica  -2.2389 -2.0878 -1.6731 -2.8238  0.3877 -0.1246 -0.1346  0.8930 2.0222 0.2970 0.8620  7 
Papua  New  Guinea  -3.6573 -3.6488 -2.8405 -4.2677  0.4166 -0.0062 -0.0143  0.9886 1.8792 1.6752 0.4327  32 
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Estimates of conditional sector aid volatility
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